INTRODUCTION
The activities of multinational corporations ('MNCs') often have a positive effect on economic, social and cultural rights. They provide employment, thus facilitating the right to work. Their innovations can lead to the creation of new products, such as new medicines and computers, which facilitate the enjoyment of the rights to health or the right to education. Corporate employers may voluntarily provide for certain economic and social benefits for their workers, such as the provision of antiretroviral drugs for HIV-positive workers in the developing world, or the provision of education for younger workers. Corporate philanthropy can of course assist millions outside a corporation's direct sphere of influence. Their investment activities may be assumed to increase wealth, thus increasing the level of affluence in societies, and the ability of people to afford satisfactory levels of economic and social prosperity. 1 However, the picture is not all rosy. MNCs are capable of committing acts that detrimentally impact on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural ('ESC') rights. MNCs have been accused of adopting exploitative labour practices, breach- * Sarah Joseph is a Professor of Human Rights Law at Monash University, Melbourne, and the Director of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. This chapter is part of the outcomes of an Australian Research Council Linkage grant on 'Multinational Corporations and Human Rights'. The author would like to thank Joanna Kyriakakis, who assisted with the footnotes in this chapter, and the editor for inviting my contribution. 1 However, while the increase in MNC activity across the world may have contributed to an increase in world wealth, it has not contributed to a more equal distribution of that wealth. It seems that the benefits of MNC investment flow disproportionately to the richest people, while the very poor receive little to no benefit. ing rights to just conditions of work. MNCs are also accused of practices that are antipathetic to trade unions. Poor occupational health and safety ('OHS') standards can harm the rights to health of workers, and people in the vicinity of a corporation's operations. Corporate negligence and/or subsequent cover-ups can unacceptably expose consumers to dangerous goods, such as unsafe automobiles or asbestos products. Poor environmental practices can contaminate food sources, which can harm rights to food and health. Corporate ownership of vital commodities, such as water or the patents in life-saving drugs, may drive the price of essential commodities so high as to price them out of the reach of poor people. This is not to say that MNCs, on the whole, are detrimental for the enjoyment of ESC rights.
2 It is to say that MNCs are capable of harming ESC rights in a multitude of ways.
When MNCs perpetrate abuses of human rights, it is to be hoped that they will be held responsible for those abuses. The most obvious source of such corporate accountability is regulation by the government of the territory in which those abuses take place, such as laws regulating labour, OHS, and environmental practices. For example, one might expect liability for the Bhopal disaster in India in 1984, when a Union Carbide plant leaked poison gas and killed and maimed tens of Unique problems can arise in holding MNCs accountable for abuses of ESC rights. First, it is trite to note that some MNCs are very powerful economic entities. In some cases, MNCs may be more powerful than the countries in which they operate. Certainly, some individual MNCs are more economically wealthy than individual countries. 4 Some developing nations may perceive that they need corporate investment to attain a satisfactory level of economic development. In such situations, a developing nation may be reluctant to punish corporate malfeasance, fearing that such punishment may repel corporate investment. Indeed, local laws may not prescribe adequate regulations. It is feared that developing countries may be competing with each other to offer attractive labour and environmental regimes to corporate investors, generating a 'race to the bottom', which is seriously prejudicing labour rights and those rights prejudiced by environmental degradation. 5 Essentially, the first problem in holding 3 Examples of relevant cases include the string of litigation against James Hardie in Australia regarding its production and sale of asbestos products, resulting in asbestos related diseases in Australia. Such litigation will often take place outside an explicit human rights context. For example, any action against a company regarding its product safety or OHS practices has implications for the ESC rights to health and work. However, the legal arguments made in such a case will focus on the words of the applicable product safety or OHS standards, which might not be drafted in 'rights' language. 4 MNCs accountable for abuses of ESC rights is that accountability is expected to flow from host governments, which may be in a subordinate power relationship with the MNC. It is always problematic for accountability and the rule of law for a less powerful entity to be required to regulate a more powerful entity.
Second, the corporate form of MNCs may facilitate the avoidance of responsibility. Each corporate component of an MNC is a separate legal person, insulating the broader group from liability for the actions of one of its parts. An MNC can allocate its resources and legal responsibilities so as to minimise risk, even if, as is often the case, it in fact operates as a single commercial unit. 6 Therefore, a vigilant host country may not be able to exercise effective jurisdiction in regard to an abuse perpetrated by an MNC, as it may only have jurisdiction over a local subsidiary that does not have sufficient assets to adequately compensate for its human rights abuses. For example, Indian courts clearly had jurisdiction over Union Carbide's subsidiary in Bhopal. However, that Indian subsidiary did not have enough money to provide adequate compensation for the disaster. On the other hand, the parent company in New York probably did have sufficient assets. Any Indian judgment against the New York company would have required an Indian court to pierce the corporate veil between the Indian and US companies. If the US company did not comply with the judgment, the Indian court would have had to rely on a US court to enforce the judgment. accountability for MNCs when they perpetrate abuses of ESC rights. I now turn to examine alternative potential sources of accountability.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Human Rights Treaties
States have duties to respect, protect and promote human rights under international human rights law. The duty to protect human rights entails an obligation to protect people from abuse of their rights by other people, including artificial entities like MNCs. For example, the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the body established to monitor the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights ('ICE-SCR'), stated in its General Comment 14 on the Right to Health: 8 Violations of the obligation to protect follow from the failure of a State to take all necessary measures to safeguard persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to health by third parties. This category includes such omissions as the failure to regulate the activities of individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent them from violating the right to health of others . . . Though the contours of the State's duties regarding human rights in the private sphere are underdeveloped in international jurisprudence, it is clear that states can be held to have violated their human rights obligations if they fail to exercise due diligence in preventing or punishing human rights abuses in that sphere. 
Guidelines and Other International Standards
Voluntary guidelines for MNC behaviour have been formulated by a number of international organisations. For example, the UN Global Compact requires MNCs to commit to ten core principles, which relate to human rights, labour rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption. The Global Compact provides a useful forum for dialogue and information transfer on these issues. However, there is no monitoring of the human rights record of signatory corporations, so no accountability is built into the mechanism beyond some reporting requirements. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall respect economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights and contribute to their realization, in particular the rights to development, adequate food and drinking water, the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, adequate housing, privacy, education, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and freedom of opinion and expression, and shall refrain from actions which obstruct or impede the realization of those rights.
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It is envisaged in Part H of the Norms that these duties will be enforceable in a variety of ways, including, in Paragraph 18, enforcement by national courts and international tribunals.
Therefore, an MNC's enforceable duties with regard to ESC rights, according to the Norms, extend to their 'spheres of activity and influence'. This key term is not comprehensively defined in the Norms. Some guidance is given in Paragraph (b) of the Commentary on Paragraph 1 of the Norms:
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall have the responsibility to use due diligence in ensuring that their activities do not contribute directly or indirectly to human rights abuses, and that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from abuses of which they were aware or ought to have been aware. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall further refrain from activities that would undermine the rule of law as well as governmental and other efforts to promote and ensure respect for human rights, and shall use their influence in order to help promote and ensure respect for human rights. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall inform themselves of the human rights impact of their principal activities and major proposed activities so that they can further avoid complicity in human rights abuses. The Norms may not be used by States as an excuse for 34 See also ibid. paras. 5-9 (rights of workers), 10, 13, and 14.
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failing to take action to protect human rights, for example, through the enforcement of existing laws.
Therefore, it was clearly envisaged in the Norms that an MNC's human rights obligations, including its obligations regarding ESC rights, will extend beyond merely negative duties (the duty to refrain from abuses) and will also encompass positive duties (the duty to take actions to prevent rights violations and, on occasion, enhance the enjoyment of human rights).
In The report goes on to outline the appropriate content of legally enforceable corporate duties that should be imposed by States, namely the 'duty to respect' human rights: corporations should be expected to refrain from harming human rights, or remedy abuses that they perpetrate. The Special Representative does not envisage that corporations should have binding duties to improve a human rights situation, but their operations should at least be human rights neutral. The duty to respect does not merely entail negative duties, as fulfilment of such duties will not realistically result in the non-occurrence of harm; companies would therefore have to exercise due diligence to prevent human rights harm.
The Special Representative adds that a corporation's 'duties to respect' will be enforced by 'social expectations', rather than only by legally imposed obligations. Therefore, he prompts corporations to respect human rights even in the absence of legal obligations, a situation which arises when a State fails in its duties to appropriately regulate a company, or in numerous grey or ambiguous zones which will inevitably continue to exist at the margins of a 'duty ro respect'. "Social expectations" help to prevent legal obligations from becoming a ceiling as opposed to a floor for corporate human rights impacts. 39 38 Ibid. para 45. 39 Ibid. para 55. The power of 'social expectations' in the MNC/human rights debate should not be underestimated, and may impact beyond the duty to respect human rights. Many MNCs are highly dependent on their reputations for their success and therefore are susceptible to moral arguments. For example, it is unlikely that charitable contributions by MNCs to disaster relief (unless an MNC causes the disaster) would be part of an MNC's duties to 'respect' human rights. Yet Australian companies were undoubtedly 'shamed' into making or increasing their charitable contributions to tsunami aid appeals. See plaints. 40 Such a body could play an important enforcement role if it had the power to make decisions that a company has in fact violated (or has not violated) human rights. Whilst international enforcement would likely be lacking, the decisions of such a body, so long as it commanded sufficient respect from States, business and civil society, could have an important shaming (or exonerating) effect. Shame could have a significant galvanising effect on a company, particularly one which relies on its brand to attract customers.
International Trade and Investment Mechanisms: MNC Rights
The flipside of the absence of direct duties for MNCs in international law is that they are conferred significant benefits or rights under certain international trade and investment mechanisms. This is the first time that a major corporation has ever dropped a major international trade case such as this one as a direct result of global public pressure, and it sets an important precedent for the politics of future trade cases like it.
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For its part, Bechtel claimed that the suit was dropped as soon as it received an unambiguous admission that the concession failed due to civil unrest, rather than any fault of the companies.
It is uncertain whether States have yet submitted explicit human rights arguments in relevant cases, given that most relevant cases, such as that mentioned above regarding South Africa, are pending. NGOs have submitted amicus briefs in a number of international trade and investment cases in which they use human rights arguments to defend the actions of the respondent states. 44 Indeed, an ICSID tribunal has affirmed its power to accept amicus briefs from NGOs in the Suez/Vivendi case, despite an objection from one of the parties. operate as an effective shield in the face of international investment rights. On the other hand, the harsh spotlight of civil society pressure may have the potential to be a substitute shield, as arguably demonstrated in the Bechtel case.
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION
If it is unsatisfactory for legal accountability for MNC activity to arise solely from the government with territorial jurisdiction over that activity, an alternative source of MNC accountability arises from extraterritorial regulation by other governments. In the last decade, there has been a marked growth in the instances of transnational litigation against companies regarding their offshore activities. 46 Such litigation has normally occurred in the MNC's home State. 47 While home States may not have an international legal duty to regulate the overseas activities of their companies, they may nevertheless choose to do so. 
Alien Tort Claims Act (US)
A notable source of such 'transnational accountability' is the ancient US statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 ('ATCA'), which grants aliens rights to sue people in US federal courts for breaches of the 'law of nations'. 49 
is that the relevant breach of international law must be 'definable, obligatory and universally condemned'. 51 It seems that this latter formula is simply a method by which US courts 'have attempted to translate the test for identifying customary international law into a domestic context'.
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In ATCA jurisprudence to date, only a small group of the most egregious civil and political rights violations have been found to breach 'the law of nations'. 53 In contrast, allegations regarding egregious environmental damage and breaches of ESC rights have been found to fall outside the ATCA. As noted above, in order to state a claim under the ATCA, we have required that a plaintiff allege a violation of a "clear and unambiguous" rule of customary international law. . . . Far from being "clear and unambiguous," the statements relied on by plaintiffs to define the rights to life and health are vague and amorphous. . . . These principles are boundless and indeterminate. They express virtuous goals understandably expressed at a level of abstraction needed to secure the adherence of States that disagree on many of the particulars regarding how actually to achieve them. But in the words of a sister circuit, they "state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations." 55 The By concentrating on the bare words of international treaties, the Flores decision fails to recognise the enormous amount of work that has been done to clarify the meaning of the rights in those treaties, such as the adoption by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights of a detailed General Comment on the Right to Health.
56 However, given the history of US scepticism over the validity of ESC rights as 'rights', 57 and that country's failure to ratify the ICESCR, it is not surprising that US courts have failed to classify ESC rights as falling within the inner core of human rights protected by custom.
Furthermore, the relevant breach of the law of nations under ATCA normally must include an element of 'State action'. That is, breaches of the law of nations are normally only found if a government is somehow involved in the breach. This requirement arises from the fact that international law, including the law of nations, has generally evolved as a system that binds governments rather than non-governmental actors. Therefore, in the cases against MNCs, an element of State complicity in a violation perpetrated by an MNC, or MNC complicity in a violation by a State, must normally be present on the facts. This requirement again narrows the range of human rights abuses for which a corporation can be held liable under ATCA.
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It therefore seems that ATCA does not offer a remedy to victims of ESC violations by MNCs. However, ATCA is relevant where the relevant ESC violation can be simultaneously characterised as a breach of a civil and political right that forms part of the law of nations. For example, the rights to be free from slavery and forced labour have been classified as being protected under 'the law of nations'. 59 These violations constitute breaches of decided on the merits. The cases have largely stalled due to the numerous preliminary challenges raised by the corporate defendants, which have taken some time to resolve, and have often led to dismissal of the case. So far, cases have tended to settle if plaintiffs make it through the minefield of preliminary hearings. I will discuss two bases for such preliminary challenges: forum non conveniens and the corporate veil.
In almost every transnational human rights case against a company, the corporate defendant has sought to have the case dismissed on the basis of the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens ('FNC'). This doctrine may be applied at a judge's discretion to dismiss a case on the basis that the case should properly be heard in another jurisdiction. Given that transnational human rights cases against companies involve allegations regarding actions or consequences in another country, there is clearly scope to argue that the case should properly be heard in that other country.
In the US, a defendant must establish that there exists an adequate alternative forum for the litigation, and that the balance of private and public interests favours litigation in the alternative forum rather than in the US, in order to persuade a court to dismiss a case on the basis of FNC. FNC arguments are becoming less successful in ATCA cases, as judges are increasingly willing to recognise that the alternative jurisdiction in an ATCA case, which necessarily involves allegations of extreme human rights abuses and normally involves allegations that the relevant foreign government is involved in that abuse (due to the State action requirement), may be too corrupt or dangerous for a plaintiff to proceed in. 69 In ATCA cases, judges are also willing to recognise the US policy interests in providing a forum to avail plaintiffs of human rights remedies under ATCA. 70 In both Connelly and Lubbe, the plaintiffs had tried to get around the FNC argument by suing the parent companies for their alleged negligent failure to adequately supervise the OHS policies of their African subsidiaries. On that analysis, the true sites of the torts in both cases were the boardrooms in the UK rather than the subsidiary operations in Africa. It seems that the argument was not accepted in Lubbe, as in that case South Africa was found to be a more appropriate forum from a purely geographic point of view. It is unlikely to have been deemed a more appropriate geographic forum if the court had accepted that the UK was the true site of the relevant tort. 84 In 84 In Connelly, the arguments located the torts in both the UK and Namibia, so the Court was not called upon to decide whether the UK was the 'true' site of the tort. 
